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ABSTRACT
Machine Learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and
will highly likely produce incorrect outputs under these attacks.
There are white-box and black-box attacks regarding to adversarys
access level to the victim learning algorithm. To defend the learning
systems from these attacks, existing methods in the speech domain
focus on modifying input signals and testing the behaviours of
speech recognizers. We, however, formulate the defense as a classi-
fication problem and present a strategy for systematically generating
adversarial example datasets: one for white-box attacks and one for
black-box attacks, containing both adversarial and normal exam-
ples. The white-box attack is a gradient-based method on Baidu
DeepSpeech with the Mozilla Common Voice database while the
black-box attack is a gradient-free method on a deep model-based
keyword spotting system with the Google Speech Command dataset.
The generated datasets are used to train a proposed Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), together with cepstral features, to detect
adversarial examples. Experimental results show that, it is possible
to accurately distinct between adversarial and normal examples for
known attacks, in both single-condition and multi-condition training
settings, while the performance degrades dramatically for unknown
attacks. The adversarial datasets and the source code are made
publicly available.
Index Terms— Speech recognition, adversarial attack, convo-
lutional neural network, cepstral feature
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent investigations in machine learning have demonstrated that
machine learning systems are vulnerable against designed inputs
known as adversarial examples [1, 2], a fundamental type of adver-
sarial learning attack called test-time evasion [3]. Earlier adversarial
attacks were applied on machine learning models of image domain
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and then these attacking methods have been spread
out onto other domains, e.g. speech signals [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. The
adversary adds a very small optimized perturbation, which is not de-
tectable by human, to a legitimate input and generates an adversarial
example that results the learning model to return a wrong output.
It is therefore important to be able to detect adversarial attacks and
subsequently for example prevent passing on the attacking signals to
the learning model, a speech recognizer in the context of this work,
so as to avoid outputting wrong results.
In general, there are two main categories of approaches in adver-
sarial attacks as targeted’ and ’non-targeted’ attacks. In non-targeted
attacks the adversary aims to make the learning model return a wrong
output and being wrong is enough. In targeted attacks the adversary
aims to make the learning model return a particular output that is
wrong and different from the expected output. Generating targeted
examples is generally more difficult. This research focuses on tar-
geted type of attacks on speech signal inputs for speech to text tasks.
It is noted that adversarial examples in this context differ from data
examples generated through generative adversarial networks [14, 15]
where examples are generated via adversarial training for the pur-
pose of e.g. data augmentation and enhancement.
The adversary’s level of access to the victim learning model
categorizes attacking methods in two different types: 1) white-box
where the adversary has full access to the layers and parameters of
the victim learning model, and 2) black-box where the adversary
has no access to these. The state-of-the-art white-box attack in the
speech domain is Carlini & Wagner (C&W) method [9] that is a
gradient-based method using iterative optimization and has achieved
100% success rate in their experiment. The similarity between nor-
mal and corresponding adversarial examples is 99% when the victim
model is Baidu DeepSpeech [16] and the dataset is Mozilla Common
Voice dataset [17]. As a black-box attack, Alzantot method [10] is a
gradient-free method using genetic algorithm optimization and has
reported 87% overall success rate. The similarity between normal
and corresponding generated adversarial examples is 85% when the
victim model is Speech Command classification algorithm [18] and
the dataset is Google Speech Command dataset [19].
Due to high success rates of adversarial attacks and their high
similarity to normal examples, distinction of adversarial and normal
examples is a highly motivated task. Research on adversarial at-
tack detection or characterization has mostly focused on image do-
main [20, 21]. One latest and comprehensive work in speech do-
main [22] is to use temporal dependencies to characterize adversar-
ial examples. Defense methods, e.g. signal transformation [22] and
obfuscated gradients [23], have also been investigated, but they pro-
vide rather limited robustness improvement in face of advanced at-
tacks. Audio preprocessing methods and their ensemble for defense
against black-box attacks are studied in [24]. In [25], noise flooding
is applied to signals for defensing against black-box examples. All
these methods are concerned with modifying input signals and test-
ing the behaviours of the recognition model and have moderate suc-
cess. There is a lack of studying dedicated systems for detecting both
white-box and black-box adversarial examples in audio and speech
domain. This motivates us to formulate the defense against speech
adversarial attacks as a classification problem, design a strategy for
generating adversarial example datasets covering both black-box and
white-box attacks and propose a CNN-based detection system. The
created adversarial example datasets and the source code for adver-
sarial example detection are made publicly available 1.
In generating adversarial examples, we take into account the
length of source speech signals, the proportion of speech and non-
1http://kom.aau.dk/˜zt/online/adversarial_examples
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speech in a signal, and the length of targeted sentences and we con-
sider both white-box and black-box attacks. For feature extraction,
we apply cepstral features. For the detection model, we propose
a CNN structure with small kernels in order to detect small per-
turbations in adversarial examples. To our knowledge, this is the
first practical investigation on adversarial attack detection in speech
recognition tasks.
2. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ALGORITHMS AND
DATASET GENERATION
This section introduces two state-of-the-art attacking methods, one
for white-box and another for black-box, and describes how we sys-
tematically generate datasets for detection of adversarial examples.
2.1. Attacking methods
One of the most successful white-box attacking methods is C&W
[9]. This method uses Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC)
loss function [26] for perturbation optimization. Like all white-box
attacks, the adversary has full access to all layers and parameters
of the speech recognition model and can use all gradients to mini-
mize the perturbation while maximizing the success rate. Equation
1 shows the optimization of perturbation in the C&W method:
minimizeδ ‖ δ ‖22 +c.l(x+ δ, t)
such that dBx(δ) < τ
(1)
where δ is the added perturbation, x is the legitimate speech exam-
ple, t is the desired target by adversary, l(.) is the CTC loss function
and the value c is being updated to make a balance between changing
the example x to an adversarial example and keeping it close to the
original normal example. The parameter τ is a threshold to indicate
that the scale of perturbation δ should not be more than τ in order to
keep the perturbation very low.
As an example for black-box attacking methods, we choose the
Alzantot [10] attacking method. This is a gradient-free method that
uses a genetic algorithm. The method has access only to the input
and output of the victim speech recognition system. The difference
between normal and adversarial examples for both attacking meth-
ods is illustrated in Fig. 1 using three spectrograms. The first one
(a) belongs to a normal command example chosen from the Google
Speech Command dataset. The original sentence of the sample is
”yes”. Spectrograms (b) and (c) are the generated adversarial exam-
ples with C&W method and Alzantot method, respectively, using the
same target word ”right”.
Figure 1 shows that the C&W method makes less changes in
the speech region of original signal. The patterns of perturbation in
the non-speech region are different in (b) and (c). When we listen
to examples (b) and (c), we can clearly hear ”yes” but low noise is
present in the background.
2.2. Dataset generation
Based on the two attacking methods introduced above, we design
and generate two separated datasets: A for white-box attacks and
B for black-box attacks. For white-box attacks, the C&W method
is chosen to attack Baidu DeepSpeech [16] as the victim learning
model using Mozilla Common Voice dataset [17]. As speech signals
in Mozilla Common Voice dataset have different lengths, we need
choose from the huge dataset a subset of signals of various lengths
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Fig. 1. Spectrograms for normal example (a), white-box correspond-
ing adversarial example (b) and black-box corresponding adversarial
example (c). The original utterance of normal example is ”yes” and
the target for both adversarial examples is ”right”.
in a principled way. According to our preliminary tests, there are
three possibilities regarding to the length of original signals and the
length of the target as follows: 1) Length of utterance is longer than
length of target, 2) length of utterance is equal to length of target,
and 3) length of utterance is shorter than length of target.
Therefore, we categorize speech signals in the dataset to three
different classes in the term of signal length:
• Short signals: Audio files with the length of 1-2 seconds.
• Medium signals: Audio files with the length of 3-4 seconds.
• Long signals: Audio files with the length of 6-7 seconds.
The target of attack is other side of our equation. We thus also
categorize our attacking targets to the same classes according to the
common sentence lengths in the dataset and in this work compose
the following targets:
• Short target: ”Open all doors”.
• Medium target: ”Switch off wifi connection”.
• Long target: ”I need a reservation for sixteen people at the
seafood restaurant down the street”.
Another consideration about choosing audio files is to ensure
enough percent of speech region in the signal. There are some sam-
ples of minutes long but containing no speech and they are not good
candidates for our dataset. We have chosen only audio files that con-
tain more than 68% of speech using the open-source robust Voice
Activity Detection (rVAD) algorithm [27].
For each of the three categories of normal examples (short,
medium and long), we chose 100 examples to be attacked. Each
example was attacked by using the three targets (short, medium and
long). Consequently, we generated 100×3×3 (i.e. 900) adversarial
examples. To have a balanced dataset without repeated samples, we
chose 900 normal examples (300 examples for each category) that
are different from the previously chosen 100 normal ones, to repre-
sent normal examples. In the end, we have the dataset A containing
900 adversarial examples and 900 normal examples.
The black-box method uses mutual targeting on Google Speech
Command dataset [19], from which 10 different commands have
been chosen. For each command, we use 20 samples. The attacking
algorithm generates adversarial examples for each command using
all other 9 commands as the target, so called mutual targeting. As
a result, we have 10 × 20 × 9 (i.e. 1800) adversarial examples in
our generated dataset. Afterwards, we add other 1800 normal exam-
ples (180 examples for each command) to the dataset. The dataset
B thus contains 1800 normal and 1800 adversarial examples. Note
that all samples in both Mozilla Common Voice and Google Speech
Command datasets were recorded with 16kHz sampling rate and ad-
versarial examples were generated with the same rate.
In this work, we used a Linux machine with four Nvidia GeForce
GTX TITAN GPUs. We applied the default parameters of original
attacking methods to generate adversarial examples for both black-
box and white-box attacks. The average time to generate a black-
box adversarial example for a 1 second audio file is approximately
40 seconds and the average time to generate a white-box adversarial
example for the same audio and the same target is around 4 minutes.
3. DETECTION METHOD
In this section we present the speech feature used in this work fol-
lowed by our detection method.
3.1. Speech Feature
The Mel-frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) feature [28] that
has shown good performance across many tasks is used in this work,
while cepstral features with different filter banks [29] are of interest
for further study. The process of MFCC feature extraction involves
dividing the signal into small frames, applying Mel-frequency fil-
terbanks onto the frames, and taking logarithmic compression and
discrete cosine transform. The extracted MFCCs of a signal have
f × t dimensions where f indicates the number of coefficients and
t indicates the number of frames. In this work we have f = 40 as a
fixed value for all signals and t varies across speech samples depend-
ing on their length. In this work we use as the classifier (detection
model) a CNN model, which is widely used for speech applications
[30, 18], but input samples of different sizes present a problem for
CNN. However, this can be solved by using zero padding for all
samples, and the dimension t was set to the maximum value of our
audio samples that is 698 (the longest audio files in long category
of the dataset A). In practice, there are various ways to make this
computation more efficient, which is out of the scope.
3.2. CNN architecture
Let us consider the input speech signal represented in two dimen-
sions V ∈ <t×f . The correlation in both time and cepstral di-
mensions are to be considered in a sliding receptive field. There-
fore, we have a convolution of our input V and the weight matrix
W ∈ <(m×r)×n, where m ≤ t and r ≤ f show the area of recep-
tive field in time and cepstral directions, respectively. Consequently,
we have n feature maps with the size of s×v where s and v indicate
the dimensions of feature maps.
The proposed CNN architecture for this work, as shown in Fig.
2, is a simple and typical one that uses three convolutional layers
with small receptive fields. The first and the second 2D convolu-
tional layers have the size of 64 with a Relu activation function while
the third one has the size of 32 with a linear Selu activation func-
tion. A max-pooling layer is performed after each convolutional
layer. Next, there are a fully connected layer with the size of 128
and a binary output softmax layer to predict if the input is normal or
adversarial. Figure 2 shows the architecture of the proposed CNN.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the proposed CNN model.
The CNN architecture is designed to be very sensitive to small
changes in both time and cepstral directions. Consequently, it can
recognize small changes with special patterns. We expect that this
model performs well to detect adversarial perturbations. Detailed
architecture of the proposed CNN model is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Detailed architecture of the proposed CNN model
type size field activation
Convolutional 2D 64 kernel size=(2, 2) Relu
MaxPooling 2D pool size=(1, 3)
Convolutional 2D 64 kernel size=(2, 2) Relu
MaxPooling 2D pool size=(1, 1)
Convolutional 2D 32 kernel size=(2, 2) Linear
MaxPooling 2D
Flatten
Fully connected 128 Relu
Fully connected 2 Softmax
4. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents experimental settings, results and discussions.
4.1. Experimental settings
The experiments were conducted based on the two generated
datasets A (white-box) and B (black-box). Six different experi-
mental scenarios are designed as shown in the first three columns
of Table 2. The goal is to test the detection performance of a nar-
rowly trained system (only one type of attack) for both known and
unknown attacks and the performance of a broadly trained system
(both types of attack). We expect to have high accuracy in the sit-
uations of matched training and testing while the performance for
unknown attacks is expected to be low. Multi-condition training
with A and B is expected to boost the performance of testing on both
types of attacks with one system.
Table 2. The scenarios and accuracy results of testing data with 95%
confidence interval for our experiments
ID Training Testing Accuracy %
1 A A 99.31± 0.64
2 A B 82.07± 1.52
3 B A 48.76± 1.93
4 B B 98.42± 0.86
5 A, B A 95.53± 1.78
6 A, B B 96.41± 1.05
4.2. Training
To evaluate our CNN detection model, we have separated each
dataset (A and B) into Training and Testing subsets, with 75% for
training and 25% for testing. It was also ensured that the adver-
sarial examples in the training subset were generated from source
examples that are different from those source examples used for
generating testing adversarial examples. All training epochs are
100, which is enough for all models to converge.
4.3. Results and analysis
To have more reliable results, we ran all experiments under the same
conditions with the same configurations. Each experiment was run
10 times. The last column of Table 2 shows overall accuracy num-
bers with 95% confidence interval for all scenarios for testing data.
The accuracy numbers of matched training and testing conditions
(1 and 4) are more than 98% and those of multi-condition training
(5 and 6) are more than 96%. These results show that the CNN
model can learn adversarial perturbation very well although there
exists noise in some normal speech examples. The CNN model can
detect white-box examples better than black-box examples, which is
slightly surprising since the overall difference between normal and
adversarial examples is 99% for white-box and it is 85% for black-
box. This result can be explained by looking at the adversarial per-
turbations generated by each method. The adversarial perturbation in
white-box is very small but has special patterns (as shown in Fig. 1).
However, the adversarial perturbation in black-box attack, although
being larger, is more similar to normal noise in real world.
The results of mismatched training and testing conditions (2 and
3), as shown in Table 2, are very different. Accuracy for (Train A,
Test B) is lower than matched conditions, but is still around 81%.
The accuracy of (Train B, Test A), however, is only a random guess-
ing. This result indicates the perturbations of these two methods are
quite different and dedicated training is required.
The detailed results for the Experiment 1 (Train A, Test A) are
shown in Table 3. It is obvious that the highest accuracy of detection
happens when we have maximum difference between the length of
source signal and the length of attacking target. Furthermore, when
these two lengths are more equal, we have lower accuracy.
Table 3. Detailed accuracy results of testing data in percentage for
experiment (Train A, Test A)
Targets
Short Medium Long
L
en
gt
h Short 98.7 99.7 100
Medium 99.6 98.4 99.6
Long 100 99.2 98.4
Figure 3 illustrates the detailed results for Experiment 4 (Train
B, Test B). It shows that when we have more similarity between
source labels and target sentences in the term of phonemes, the ac-
curacy of detection is lower.
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Fig. 3. Detailed accuracy results of testing data in percentage for
experiment (Train B, Test B).
One further experiment was conducted to evaluate the perfor-
mance on unknown target sentences. Table 4 shows the results of
testing adversarial examples with unknown targets and lengths using
dataset A. The high accuracy results indicate that the model is robust
in detecting targets of unknown sentences and unknown lengths.
Table 4. The accuracy results of testing adversarial examples with
unknown targets and unknown lengths
experiment Accuracy %
Train Short & Medium, Test Long 99.44
Train Short & Long, Test Medium 99.82
Train Medium & Long, Test Short 99.26
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented a strategy to systematically generate two sepa-
rated datasets of adversarial speech examples using state of the art
attacking methods, one for white-box attacks and one for black-
box attacks. Then, we proposed a CNN model for adversarial at-
tack detection and evaluated the model with the generated datasets
through matched, mismatched and multi-condition training and test-
ing strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that it is feasible
to train a learning model to accurately detect adversarial examples
generated from known attacking methods while detecting unknown
attacks deserves more attention. The work further provides insights
about the behaviours of different training strategies.
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